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ABSTRACT 
Cyber attacks are becoming more prevalent across all sectors of government, 
business, and academia. Academic networks can be more vulnerable to attack because of 
a lack of resources and funding. This thesis analyzed unsuccessful Secure Shell (SSH) 
login attempts with data extracted from the DenyHosts service on the Naval Postgraduate 
School’s (NPS) network, and compared it to SSH logon data from a Kippo SSH honeypot 
independent from the NPS network to determine patterns in activity associated with 
geolocation. Additionally, this thesis analyzed the frequency of the originating IP 
address, then tried to determine if proxies were being used and how regularly. We 
identified similar characteristics of attacking hosts for both networks, and noted an 
excessive of use of vulnerable platforms and ports.  
Our methodology did not allow us to ascertain if any of the attacks were 
automated, but we have high confidence that the remote sites were compromised because 
of their preponderant use of vulnerable software. Also we identified common use of ports 
5060 and 8080 suggesting possible botnet activity associated to these sites. 
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Cyber attacks are becoming more prevalent across all sectors of academia, 
business, and government. To better protect these networks, attacks must be analyzed to 
determine popular methods, their rate of occurrence, and their origin. We should try to 
correlate these attempts and to identify patterns to associate known malicious threats and 
also alert of new emerging malicious activity.  
B. PURPOSE 
This thesis will analyze two data sources, the unsuccessful-attempt Secure Shell 
(SSH) log on data extracted from the DenyHosts service on Naval Postgraduate School’s 
(NPS) network, and the SSH logon data from a Kippo SSH honeypot, unaffiliated with 
the NPS network. We will attempt to find the similarities and differences in the patterns 
and geolocation of the data analyzed from NPS’s network and the Kippo honeypot. The 
differences will help us analyze whether or not these attacks are coming from a single 
country based on IP geolocation and time, if the attackers are using proxies to route their 
attacks, if the attacks are automated, and if the hosts with IP addresses associated with 
NPS were attacked more often than the Kippo honeypot. 
C. BENEFITS OF STUDY 
The benefits of this study include better understanding of the who, what, when, 
where, why, and how of attempted SSH breaches on networks, and can assist 
information-assurance efforts in developing more effective security policies for 
organizations. The methodology and results of this thesis can be applied to other U.S. 
government and DOD networks. 
D. SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY 
This thesis will only analyze two sets of data from attempted Secure Shell (SSH) 
logon activity collected over a seven month period, one set from Naval Postgraduate 
 2
School’s (NPS) DenyHosts service and one set from a Kippo SSH honeypot setup 
independent of NPS’s network. 
The data sets will be compared to find common IP addresses. Those common IP 
addresses will then be analyzed for geolocation patterns, whether or not those IP 
addresses have been used as proxies, operating system type, and any open ports on the 
host. 
E. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY 
The most recent work related to SSH attacks will be discussed in Chapter II, and 
we will explain our methodology to address the problem. In Chapter III, we will detail 
the test environment setup including hardware, operating system, and honeypot 
configuration. We will also discuss how the data was collected and formatted. Chapter IV 
will describe the tests we ran to analyze the data collected. Chapter V discusses the 
results of the comparison of data gathered from the Kippo honeypot and the NPS-
network DenyHosts logs. Finally, in Chapter VI, we will state the achievements of our 
testing and analysis and make recommendations for future research.  
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II. SIMILAR WORK IN SSH HONEYPOT  
GEOLOCATION ANALYSIS 
A. INTRODUCTION TO LITERATURE REVIEW 
According to RFC 4252, the Secure Shell protocol (SSH) supports secure remote 
login over an insecure network. Three major protocols make up the SSH protocol. Those 
are the transport-layer, user-authentication, and connection protocols [1]. “The transport-
layer protocol provides server authentication, confidentiality, and integrity with perfect 
forward secrecy” [1]. The user authentication protocol enables “authentication between 
the client and the server” and the connection protocol divides “the encrypted tunnel into 
several logical channels” [1].  
The authentication part of SSH can be implemented by three different methods: 
“public-key, password, and host-based client authentication” [2]. In public-key 
authentication, the user creates an asymmetric key pair on the client and then uploads the 
public key to the server. During logon, the client sends a signature created with the 
private key of the user to the server, then the server verifies the validity of the private key 
with the public-key part of the key pair. If the signature is validated, the user is granted 
access [2]. The second method is by using a password. The user would issue a command 
to the server of ssh user@x.x.x.x. Then server would respond asking for the 
password. The user enters the password and, if correct, is given access [2]. Host based 
authentication “works by having the client send a signature created with the private key 
of the client host, which the server checks with that host's public key” [2]. When the 
host’s identity has been determined, access is granted.  
The authentication, confidentiality, and integrity established by the SSH protocol 
makes it the preferable way for users to safely interact with remote hosts. However, if not 
properly configured, SSH can become insecure, giving attackers access to systems 
otherwise thought to be secure. To study methods attackers are using to gain access to 
remote hosts via SSH, many security researchers have begun testing with honeypots.  
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Security researchers have published many papers on SSH honeypot analysis using 
various honeypots to analyze malicious activity. However, less research has been 
conducted analyzing attacks on different networks in order to determine if the attacks are 
discriminatory. This paper will use data gathered from the Kippo Honeypot and the 
DenyHosts program across two unrelated networks in an attempt to determine if the 
attackers are specifically targeting networks with certain affiliations.  
B. WHAT IS A HONEYPOT? 
According to the SANS institute, “Honey Pot Systems are decoy servers or 
systems setup to gather information regarding an attacker or intruder into your system” 
[3]. Honeypots can be installed anywhere on a network depending on the desired data to 
be gathered. Since honeypots aren't meant to be used, any connection to them is deemed, 
“at best an accidental error or, more likely, an attempt to attack the machine” [4].  
Ideally, there are two main reasons to install a honeypot. The first is to “learn how 
intruders probe and attempt to gain access to your systems” [3]. Since honeypots 
typically log all interactions with the system, the system owner is able to understand the 
attack methodologies to better protect their system from future attacks. The second is to 
“Gather forensic information required to aid in the apprehension or prosecution of 
intruders” [3]. The research material listed in this chapter includes different attempts at 
the implementation of honeypots and their results. 
C. HONEYPOT EXPERIMENTS 
A high interaction honeypot was used for one study [4]. The data was collected 
over a six month period and was based on “the lessons learned from the observation of 
the attackers when logged on a compromised machine.” The honeypot was a “standard 
Gnu/Linux installation, with kernel 2.6, with the usual binary tools. No additional 
software was installed except the http Apache server” [4]. A Linux distribution was 
installed as a virtual machine in VMWare 11, which was running the same version of 
Linux as the host. 
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Once installed, the researchers modified the tty_read, tty_write, and 
exec system call to enable the researchers “to intercept the activity on all the terminals 
of the system. The modification of the exec system call [enabled them] to record the 
system calls used by the intruder” [4]. Then, the “captured information [was] logged 
directly into a buffer of the kernel memory of the honeypot itself.” Once captured the 
information gathered was organized into a SQL database which was used to identify: “ i) 
the IP address of the attacking machine, ii) the login and the password tested, iii) the date 
of the connection, iv) the terminal associated (tty) to each connection, and v) each 
command used by the attacker.” 
D. COMPARISON OF SSH ATTACKS ACROSS DIFFERENT UNIVERSITY 
NETWORKS 
Based on data collected over a four month period from the SSH daemon, another 
paper analyzes SSH attacks against hosts in the Computer Science Department at the 
College of William and Mary [5]. An interesting outcome of his research “was the 
discovery that the behavior of malicious hosts, or bots, is surprisingly deterministic” [5]. 
His research was able to identify specific “time[s] that a bot sleeps between attacks, or 
the inter-arrival time of failed logins from a source”, and was concluded to be “nearly 
constant across all hosts in a suspected botnet” [5]. His research was also able to identify 
“if an attack source is a bot” based on “the number of parallel login attempts from a 
source and the average number of failed attempts per day” [5].  
A third paper analyzed real-world SSH attack data obtained from Quarantainenet, 
“a Dutch company that develops network management and security tools and provides 
admission control and malware detection for their customers, including more than half of 
Dutch universities” [6]. The data was then input into GeoPlugin, which uses the 
MaxMind database for geolocation. Almost all IP address geolocation is currently done at 
the country level. According to MaxMind, who test their databases on a periodic basis, 
“their databases were 99.8% accurate on a country level, 90% accurate on a state level in 
the US, and 81% accurate for cities in the US within a 50 kilometer radius” [7].  
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The authors attempted to use geolocation at the city level to answer their main 
research question, “Which cities in the world are responsible for most of the security 
incidents?” [6]. The results of their tests listed the top 20 cities by number of attacks per 
city. The top three cities responsible for the most attacks during the time between 
October 29, 2010 and November 4, 2014, were Seoul, Taipei, and Beijing with 735, 618, 
and 563 attacks, respectively. 
The object of another research experiment was the brute-force attacks conducted 
against eight different Kojoney honeypots on six university campuses. These networks 
“were completely separated and had no explicit or logical links to interconnect them” [8]. 
Additionally, each network used a different ISP. Each honeypot was installed on “low-
end PCs with CentOS Linux operating system[s]” [8]. The Kojoney software on each PC 
was altered by the researchers to include the following functionality: 
 Add password logging to the authentication mechanism to log the 
passwords used in all login attempts. 
 Add user-agent detection to find out what client software was used by 
attackers. 
 Add support for XMPP [9] to create a warning system that could alert the 
system administrator about ongoing attack activities. 
 Add support of P0f as an OS fingerprinting tool. 
 Upgrade the IP geolocation function to provide accurate information about 
attackers’ origin. 
 Upgrade the shell-prompt mechanism to make the system more realistic. 
 In addition, a collection of scripts were written to extract attack data from 
the honeypot log files and insert them into a local database. For 
aggregation and analysis, the local databases were regularly synchronized 
with a central database server [8]. 
The honeypots were active for 47 days, August 20, 2011 through October 6, 2011, 
[8]. During that time, the eight honeypots received “nearly 98,180 connection requests 
which were originated from 1153 IP addresses and 79 countries” [8]. The test isolated 
three of the originating 1153 IP addresses, which were used against six of the honeypots. 
Also, on more than half of the honeypots, 50% of the IP addresses were involved in the 
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attacks [8]. Out of all of the login attempts, 66.42% of them tried to use “root” as the 
username and 19% percent of the attempts used the username and password combo 
“root:root”. 
The top five sources of these attacks were from the United States, China, Poland, 
Canada, and, Argentina with frequencies of 17.9%, 10%, 9.1%, 6.6%, and 6.1%, 
respectively. The researchers also found “more than 82% of connections were established 
from a Linux system and only 3% was from [a] Windows machine” utilizing the most 
common user agent, SSH-2.0libssh-0.1, 85.3% of the time [8].  
The researchers conclude the study with assertions that because Linux is such  
a widely used operating system, it has become a “bigger target to hackers in general”  
but “in terms of overall security, it is still far superior to [W]indows” [8]. They go on  
to defend their opinion by explaining that “[t]he open source nature of Linux allows  
for more peer review of the code to find and fix the code before zero day hacks can be 
done” [8]. 
E. POST ATTACK BEHAVIOR 
Another paper attempted to analyze SSH attacks in a different way. Instead of 
exploring methods on how to keep attackers out of their network, they studied “post-
compromise attack behavior” [10]. They set up four honeypots, all of which were running 
a slimmed-down version of Fedora Core 3 text mode environment updated as of October 
10, 2006 [10]. “[A] modified OpenSSH server [was used] to collect attempted passwords, 
syslog-ng to remotely log important system events, including logins and password 
changes, Strace to record all system calls made by incoming SSH connections, and the 
Honeynet Project's Sebek tool [2] to secretly collect all keystrokes on incoming SSH 
connections.” [10]. The only other modification to the honeypot was code used to record 
all passwords tried during the attempted logins. 
Before configuring the honeypots, the researcher ran some tests to determine 
which usernames were most common. The usernames admin, mysql, oracle, sarah, and 
louise were then configured on the honeypots, admin as the root user and the other four 
as non-privileged user accounts [10]. The tests “also revealed that the most commonly 
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tried passwords were '(username)', '(username)123', 'password', and '123456', where 
(username) represents the username being tried” [10]. The researchers rotated these 
passwords among the honeypots and, after a compromise, the next password in the list 
was used [10]. Finally, to make the non-root accounts enticing to attackers, two of the 
honeypots were setup with strong root passwords. “The other two honeypots had root 
accounts that rotated through the passwords: ‘root’, ‘root123’, ‘password’, and 
‘1234456’” [10]. 
The data collection was facilitated by two dedicated servers, one to collect syslog 
data and the other to collect “Sebek data, Strace data, and hourly snapshots of the 
.bash_history and wtmp files” [10]. To ensure the honeypots were not used for malicious 
activity once they were compromised, the researchers used pre-built images which were 
reloaded following each compromising attack. 
All four honeypots were run for a “24-day period from November 14 to 
December 8, 2006” [10]. During that period, “attackers from 229 unique IP addresses 
attempted to log in a total of 269,262 times (an average of 2,805 attempts per computer 
per day). Out of these, 824 logged in successfully, and 157 changed an account 
password” [10]. The researcher found that even though commonly used usernames and 
passwords were used on the honeypots, only about .31 percent of the attacks were 
successful [10]. This key observation led the researchers to believe that most, if not all, of 
the attacks were coming from a “low-skill[ed] attacker is using scripts to attack dozens of 
systems at once” [10]. 
To gather more detailed information about the attacks on the honeypots, the 
researchers developed a group of seven states that would be monitored for each 
honeypot: 
1. CheckSW – 'Check software configuration' allows the attacker to gain 
more information about the system's software or its users.  
2. Install – 'Install a program.' This refers to new software being installed by 
an attacker. 
3. Download – 'Download a file.' This refers to remote file downloads by the 
attacker. 
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4. Run – 'Run a rogue program.' This refers to the attacker running a program 
that was not originally part of the system. 
5. Password – 'Change the account password.' This refers to changing the 
password of the compromised account. 
6. CheckHW – 'Check the hardware configuration.' This refers to actions that 
allow the attacker to gain more information about the system's hardware 
(uptime, network, CPU speed/type). 
7. ChangeConf – 'Change the system configuration.' This refers to attacker 
activity that permanently changes the state of the system [10]. 
 
The data collected about the state definitions indicated no difference between the 
attacks on root and user accounts. The data did, however, disclose the most popular 
course of action, which “was to check the software configuration, change the password, 
check the hardware and/or software configuration (again), download a file, install the 
downloaded program, and then run it” [10].  
The researchers believe the results from the experiment contributed in two ways 
[10]. First, they concluded that administrators should not use any of the usernames and 
passwords tested in the experiment and that “[d]irect remote root logins should be 
disabled, only allowing select users to 'su' into the root account once logged on” [10]. 
Second, administrators can use the findings to choose “security tools to combat the most 
common attacker actions… which include downloading/installing/running rogue software 
and checking the software configuration” [10]. 
F. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
The research summarized above indicates a large interest in improving the 
security of hosts that use the SSH service. It appears that attacks don’t appear to have 
many patterns. All appear to be scripted in some form or another, but there does not 
appear to be any specific direction to any of these attacks. This paper tries to extend this 
research further to determine if the attacks identified on networks of different affiliations 
can reveal any further details. Only then can we better understand the motives of 
attackers. 
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III. TEST ENVIRONMENT, DATA ORIGINATION,  
AND TOOL DESCRIPTIONS 
In this chapter, we describe the test environment, origin of the two data sets being 
analyzed, and the tools used for analysis. Two networks gathered data for our 
experiments. One was the NPS network that we used as our control. SSH login data from 
this network came from the DenyHosts server which collects login data from the servers 
running the SSH service. Figure 1 shows the layout of the NPS network.  
A. DESCRIPTION OF NETWORKS 
The NPS network has two outward-facing DNS servers (NS1 and NS2) located 
behind a firewall in the DMZ. Then another firewall separates the DMZ from the intranet.  
Figure 1.  NPS network. 
 
The DenyHosts daemon runs on every server in the DMZ and intranet offering the 
SSH service. Each of those servers then communicates with the central DenyHosts server 
that maintains the SSH logs for the entire network. At regular intervals, the DenyHosts 
server updates the other servers with newly blocked IP addresses.  
The gateway router was fed from an AT&T T-1 line running to the NPS campus 





Figure 2.  Honeypot network. 
 
As shown above, the honeypot was connected to a hub. Table 1 gives the 
hardware specification for the honeypot.  
B. DESCRIPTION OF SYSTEMS 
The honeypot host (Dell OptiPlex 745) used the Ubuntu 14.04 LTS operating 
system as a platform for our honeydrive3 virtual machine.  
Table 1.   Hardware specifications. 
Honeypot (OptiPlex 745) 
Processor Intel(R) Pentium(R) 3.4 GHz 
Memory 4 GB 
HDD Seagate 160 GB 
NIC NetXtreme BMC5754 Gigabit Ethernet PCI Express 
 
1. Tools 
The tools we used for our experiment included the Kippo SSH honeypot, 
DenyHosts, and the MaxMind geolocation database. For our experiment, a honeydrive3 
virtual machine was created in Virtualbox to use the Kippo SSH honeypot [11]. 
Honeydrive3 is a Linux honeypot distribution built as an open-box virtual appliance 
(OVA) with the Xubuntu Desktop 12.04.4 LTS installed.  
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a. Kippo 
The Kippo SSH honeypot is a tool included in the honeydrive3 distribution. It is 
designed to mimic a real Debian 5.0 file system with the ability to add and remove files. 
Kippo also has fake file contents to allow an attacker to “cat” files like /etc/passwd [12]. 
Kippo saves all downloaded files for later inspection. The Kippo data acquired from each 
session is viewable on the Kippo Graph Web page. Kippo Graph is a script used to view 
all of the honeypot statistics in an organized fashion, providing the ability to monitor the 
current status of the honeypot remotely as well as download the SSH data.  
Three of the seven Web pages in Kippo Graph were used for the analysis of our 
data, Kippo Input, Kippo Playlog, and Kippo IP. The Kippo Input page summarizes 
overall post-compromise activity, human activity inside the honeypot, top 10 inputs 
(overall), top 10 successful inputs, top 10 failed inputs, passwd commands (password-
change attempts), wget commands, and executed scripts. Examples of each metric are 
displayed in Figures 3 through 7. 
Figure 3.  Post compromised human activity. 
 





Figure 5.  Top 10 successful inputs. 
 
Figure 6.  Top 10 failed inputs. 
 
Figure 7.  Latest “passwd” commands entered by attackers. 
 
 
When clicking on the play buttons shown on the Kippo Input page (Figures 8, 9) 
the user is redirected to the Kippo Playlog page. The Playlog page allows for the replay 
of an attacker's actions once inside in the honeypot. An example of the playlog is shown 







Figure 8.  Latest “wget” commands entered by attackers. 
 
Figure 9.  Latest scripts executed by attackers. 
 




The Kippo-IP page displays all of the IP activity gathered from the honeypot. The 
last five sessions are shown in Figure 11. 




DenyHosts is a Python-based script designed for Linux system administrators  
to defend against SSH dictionary and brute force server attacks [13]. It allows 
administrators to monitor all SSH failed and successful login attempts, the usernames and 
passwords used in each attempt, and the source and destination IP addresses in each 
attempted connection. It “can be run from the command line, cron or as a daemon” [3]. 
Based on the data collected from each login attempt, the administrator can elect to 
blacklist malicious host IP addresses so that any future traffic is immediately dropped at 
the firewall.  
c. MaxMind 
According to the MaxMind website, the “GeoIP2 Precision Insights service 
provides our most accurate information about the location of an IP address to the zip  
or postal code level, includes confidence factors for geolocation data, describes the 
ISP/Organization, and provides insight into the type of user behind the IP” [14]. Its  
key IP address categories used in our analysis were country, city, postal code, time zone, 
latitude/longitude, ISP/organization, domain, Autonomous System Number & 
organization, accuracy radius, confidence factors, and user type.  
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d. NMAP 
“Network Mapper is a free and open source utility for network discovery and 
security auditing” [15]. It has the capability to identify key characteristics about hosts on 
a network such as the services offered, the operating systems used, and the firewall used. 
Nmap was used to gain operating-system and port information for each IP address 
analyzed.  
e. Shodan 
Shodan is a search engine designed for the Internet of Things (IoT). Much like 
other search engines, it crawls the internet, but instead of only indexing websites, it 
queries every IP address for host information including location, hardware type, 
operating-system type and version, associated domain, open ports, and versions of 
services being offered over those ports [16]. Our methodology used Shodan to validate 
information gathered from the other tools.  
f. IP2Location.net 
The IP2Location website aids users in finding geolocation information of an IP 
address, using type information without violating the Internet users privacy [17]. We used 
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IV. FORMATTING AND ANALYSIS OF DATA 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter, we will explain our methodology for analyzing the data from 
DenyHosts and our honeypot. 
B. DATA COLLECTION AND ORGANIZATION 
The data collected from the NPS network was extracted from the DenyHosts 
server as discussed in Chapter III. The DenyHosts daemon creates a zipped log file for 
each day in operation as shown in Figure 12.  
Figure 12.  DenyHosts daily logs. 
 
 
1. DenyHosts Data 
To efficiently organize the data in the logs, the logs were unzipped using the 
gunzip command. Figure 13 represents the raw data provided by the DenyHosts 
program. The first column is the date in year, month, and day format (YYYY-MM-DD) 
followed by the time (GMT). The next column distinguishes whether the information is 
coming from the DenyHosts daemon locally on the server, labeled “DenyHosts,” or 
whether it is coming from another machine running DenyHosts, labeled as “sync.” Then 
the last column indicates whether the server received new hosts to add to the blocked list, 
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whether it sent new hosts to add to the blocked lists on other machines running 
DenyHosts, and what specific IP addresses were added to the blocked list. 
Figure 13.  Raw data from DenyHosts 
 
 
Next, the grep command was used in conjunction with regular expressions to 
extract all of the IP addresses in each log file. Each line containing an IP address was 
then piped into a new file called IPs_Only.txt. Figure 14 shows the command used to 
grep through the log files and pipe them into a single file, and Figure 15 illustrates an 
example of the output [18]. 
Figure 14.  Grep command using regular expressions. 
 
Figure 15.  IPs_Only.txt output after grep command with regular expressions 
 
 
2. Kippo SSH Honeypot Data 
A second set of data was pulled from the Kippo Graph Web page as a comma-
separated value (csv) file, as shown in Figure 16. The first column lists the IP address of 
the host attempting to access the honeypot. The second column shows how many 
attempted connections were made by that IP address. The third column lists the number 
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of times the login attempts were successful and the last column is the date of the last 
attempted connection by the IP address. 
Figure 16.  IP activity gathered from the honeypot. 
 
 
An example of this file showing the top 10 highest number of sessions per IP 
address is shown in Figure 17. The downloaded csv file only includes two columns, the 
IP address and session count. 




3. Data Consolidation 
The honeypot IP addresses were then copied into the IPs_Only.txt file originally 
containing the DenyHosts IP addresses. Then the file containing all 8,161 IP addresses 
was uploaded to the MaxMind GeoIP2 Precision Insights Batch Lookup Service as 
shown in Figure 18. 
Figure 18.  MaxMind file upload page. 
 
 
Once uploaded, the text file was analyzed with the MaxMind database  
and it returned a csv file. The csv file contained information for each IP address  
for continent_code, continent_name, country_iso_code, country_name, 
subdivision_iso_code, subdivision_name, city_name, metro_code, postal_code, latitude, 
longitude, registered_country_iso_code, represented_country_iso_code, 
represented_country_type, is_satellite_provider, autonomous_system_number, 
autonomous_system_organization, domain, ISP, organization, user_type, 
country_confidence, subdivision_confidence, city_confidence, postal_confidence, and 
accuracy_radius. With our methodology, we only used ip_address, country_name, 
subdivision_name (state), city_name, latitude, and longitude. An example of the csv file 





Figure 19.  MaxMind csv file. 
 
 
The MaxMind csv file was then converted to xlsx format. Next the honeypot data 
was copied into a separate sheet called “Honeypot” leaving the DenyHosts data in its own 
separate sheet which was renamed “DenyHosts.” Figure 20 illustrates the changes made 
to the MaxMind csv file.  




4. Filtering for Duplicate IP Addresses 
To filter out IP addresses found in both sets of data, a COUNTIF equation  
was used shown in Figure 21. The COUNTIF equation, written in the Honeypot  
sheet under the column Match(1=yes, 0=no), compares a range of data, 
DenyHosts!$A$2:$A$1881, from the DenyHosts sheet and compares it to each cell 
in column “A” on the honeypot sheet. If the any of the IP addresses from the DenyHosts 
sheet match an of the IP addresses on the Honeypot sheet, a “1” is produced beside each 
IP address. If no match is found a “0” is produced. Figure 22 shows an example of the 
results from the COUNTIF equation. 
Figure 21.  COUNTF equation. 
 
Figure 22.  COUNTIF equations results. 
 
 
To filter out all of the “0” entries, the filter function was used with “0” so that the 






Figure 23.  Filtering for IP address matches. 
 
 
A total of 31 IP addresses were in both sets of data. Each of these IP addresses 
was checked with the ip2location.com demo tool to identify if any were known 
anonymous proxies. Each IP address was also analyzed with the Shodan website and 
Nmap to identify if any open ports on each host. Figure 24 shows an example of the 
output from the ip2location.com demo tool with the red arrow pointing to the anonymous 
proxy results [17]. Figure 25 shows the Nmap output for a single IP address and Figure 







Figure 24.  Ip2location.net demo tool. 
 




The –v option stands for verbose and will display additional information on the 
terminal. The –O option initiates an operating system (OS) scan which checks the Nmap 
database for known OS signatures and tries to find the best match for the host using its 
signatures. Finally the –Pn option is used in case the host is blocking ping probes; Nmap 
sends SYN packets to the host over 1000 commonly used ports and waits for a SYN 
ACK response [15].  
The results of an example scan are shown in Figure 25. The host had three ports 
open, 80, 5060, and 8080. There was no exact operating-system match but Nmap states 
there is a 91% probability of being Linux 2.6.32. Figures 26 and 27 show the results of a 
Shodan website query of the same IP address. 


















Figure 27.  Shodan IP address search ports and services information. 
 
 
The search revealed information about the country, organization, ISP, 
Autonomous Systems Number (ASN) ports open, and services offered, along with the 
last time this data was updated. This information was then compared with MaxMind and 
Nmap to ensure the most up to date data was used for our analysis. 
Lastly, the complete list of IP addresses encountered with the number of sessions 
was downloaded from the Kippo honeypot as shown in Figure 16. We then filtered for all 
31 IP addresses to acquire the session counts. Figure 28 shows the results after filtering. 
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Figure 28.  31 IP addresses with number of sessions. 
 
 
Results listed in the chapter were then combined with the number of sessions per 
IP address to finalize our data for analysis. Figure 29 shows the final compilation of the 













V. DATA COMPARISON RESULTS  
In this chapter, we will discuss the results from our tests outlined in Chapter IV, 
and identify the similarities and differences in the patterns and geolocation of the data 
analyzed from NPS's network and the Kippo honeypot. We also tried to determine if the 
attackers used proxies to route their attacks, if the attacks were automated, and if the 
hosts with IP addresses associated with NPS were attacked more than the Kippo 
honeypot. Finally, we analyzed files downloaded to our honeypot from IP addresses 
appearing in both sets of data.  
1. Results 
a. Geolocation Patterns 
Our methodology identified 31 individual IP addresses in both data sets. The 
distribution of the IP addresses is shown in Figure 30.  




The top four IP address-originating countries based on percentage of IP addresses 
were China with 29%, India with 13%, and Brazil and Germany with 10%. Because of 
the high percentage from China and India, we looked deeper to identify whether they had 
originated from the same cities and Internet Service Providers (ISPs). Two of the IP 
addresses from China originated in Shanghai, and one each from Beijing, Kunming, 
Lanzhou, and Xi’an. Upon deeper inspection, both of the IP addresses in Shanghai 
belonged to different ISPs, Shanghai University and Oriental Cable Network Co., Ltd. 
The four IP addresses from India included one each from Anchal, Bhagwat New Dehli, 
and Noida, but we could not identify their ISPs with any of our tools. 
b. Hardware 
The hardware analysis used information collected by MaxMind, Shodan, and 
Nmap. While 61% of the devices were unknown, we could identify key attributes of the 
devices. Figure 31 shows the breakdown of hardware devices found in our data.  
Figure 31.  Device types. 
 
 
Two of the devices were Apple Airport Extremes, which suggests that the 
attempted logins came from a home user, or at least a compromised home computer. One 
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device was a combination of a Web and mail server based on its open ports and because 
it was running Apache and Sendmail. Another group of devices was five HP Procurve 
7102dl secure routers. The popularity of this router in our data could mean that a 
vulnerability allows malicious users to access this router as a pivot point for malicious 
activity.  
The other four devices were two Virtual Private Network (VPN) routers, a server 
running Apache and Bind, and a W422G wireless router. A VPN router is an excellent 
way to ensure the anonymity of an attacker attempting access to a remote system. These 
could be infected with malware creating another pivot for malicious activity.  
c. Operating Systems 
Next, we identified the operating systems of all of the hosts. Linux accounted for 
74% of the operating systems used. The others included AVtech and Apple embedded 
operating systems and three that were not identified. Figure 32 shows a breakdown of the 
operating systems. 




We believe the popularity of the Linux 2.6.x versions indicates multiple 
vulnerabilities in those versions since the 2.6.9 version was originally released on 
19 October, 2004 [20]. Our opinion was supported by the National Vulnerability 
Database, which yielded 159 Critical Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) associated 
with Linux 2.6.x. Figure 33 shows a portion of the search results.  
Figure 33.  Vulnerability search results. 
 
 
d. Common Ports 
Further analysis looked for common port usage among all 31 IP addresses. Figure 









Figure 34.  Percentage of commonly used ports for all hosts. 
 
 
Initially, not all hosts had port 22 open, possibly indicating deliberate use of the 
port only at certain times. The majority of all hosts had ports 80, 5060, and 8080 open. 
Port 80 appears to be open on the devices for Web access, but ports 5060 and 8080 are 
usually unnecessary and seem suspect. An article written by Lenny Zeltser, called 
“Targeting VoIP: Increase in SIP Connections on UDP port 5060,” attributes an increase 
in port 5060 activity to SIP brute-forcing activities by botnets [22]. Port 8080 is typically 
an alternate to port 80, and is used for proxies. It is possible, whether intentional or 
unintentional, that devices using it could be acting as proxies for malicious activity. 
e. SSH Version 
Figure 35 shows the distribution of SSH versions used on the 31 hosts. According 
to the OpenSSH website, the identified OpenSSH versions possess vulnerabilities 









f. Anonymous Proxy 
Although we used the IP2Location website, we were unable to identify any IP 
addresses as being anonymous proxies. 
g. Session Data  
We analyzed the session information of the 31 IP addresses to identify patterns in 
activity. The DenyHosts daemon does not log any SSH login attempts after an IP address 
has been blocked, so we used the Kippo login data for the IP addresses; we believe that 
the session information for the NPS network is very similar to our Kippo results. Figure 
36 shows the number of login attempts for each IP address over the seven-month period 
the data was collected. IP addresses with less than three sessions have been removed 





Figure 36.  Session count. 
 
 
Several IP addresses have numerous attempted logons; however, there does not 
appear to be any brute forcing, which would be indicated by several hundreds if not 
thousands of sessions. This data suggests that attackers are selectively trying to gain 
access without raising any suspicion. For example, 54 login attempts over a span of 
months may not trigger any alerts on a system, but if conducted within a week would 
trigger further analysis and could lead to the blacklisting of the offending IP address. 
h. Downloaded Files 
None of the 31 IP addresses was successful in downloading any files to the Kippo 
honeypot.  
2. Conclusion 
Based on the results produced from our methodology, it is unclear whether the 
attacks are automated, but we have high confidence that the remote sites were 
compromised because of their preponderant use of vulnerable software. Use of ports 
5060 and 8080 suggests botnet activity associated to these sites. Unfortunately, the design 
of the DenyHosts daemon prevented us from determining if the NPS network was 
attacked more often than our honeypot because if its affiliation.  
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VI. CONCLUSION 
When attempting to profile attack behavior, it is important to analyze the data 
gathered with multiple tools to ensure its accuracy. Our methodology was successful in 
identifying similarities in patterns and geolocation information in the data collected from 
both networks. It identified several contributing factors that may have caused the 31 hosts 
to be compromised and therefore used to conduct malicious login attempts against the 
NPS and honeypot networks. 
The results of our methodology could be improved if both networks employed 
honeypots. A drawback in comparing honeypot and DenyHosts data was the latter’s 
DenyHosts inability to log IP addresses after they have been blocked. However, 
DenyHosts is an invaluable tool at thwarting SSH brute force attacks and should be used 
on any host offering the SSH service. 
Future work related to this topic should include multiple data sets from multiple 
network affiliations to ensure the lowest occurrence of bias possible. Each network 
should try to use identically configured honeypots for the best data comparison. If the 
DenyHosts daemon is used it should be in conjunction with IPTables or similar software 
capable of logging failed login attempts of blocked IP addresses. Other possible research 
could involve tracking the use of user names and passwords across multiple networks.  
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